Showing posts with label Directive 2004/38. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Directive 2004/38. Show all posts

Friday, 30 June 2017

The Brexit talks: opening positions on the status of UK and EU citizens




Professor Steve Peers*

Introduction

One of the most high-profile issues relating to Brexit, which could potentially have the biggest direct impact on the lives of the greatest number of people, is the issue of what happens to UK citizens in the EU and EU citizens in UK after Brexit. This is one of the first issues to be addressed in Brexit talks, and both sides have now adopted their positions: the EU in the form of a Council decision on the mandate for the Commission negotiators, back on May 22, and the UK in the form of a UK government proposal, released on June 26. As we can see from these dates, it’s entirely false to suggest (as the UK Foreign Secretary has done, for instance) that this UK government proposal came first, with no EU position yet: it’s quite the opposite. (Equally it’s false to suggest, as the Brexit Secretary does, that among the EU institutions, only the EU Commission is demanding that the ECJ have a role in the agreement).

This EU position also covers the issues of the financial consequences of Brexit and its purely transitional aspects (ie court cases pending on Brexit Day), which no published UK proposal has addressed yet. However, I will focus solely on the citizens’ rights issues for now. For the sake of simplicity, the relevant parts of the EU position are repeated in the Annex to this blog post.

There is a basic choice to be made whether the position of UK and EU citizens after Brexit is based on the ‘acquired rights’ approach (ie retaining their status under EU law) or an approach based on equality with nationals. As we will see, the EU takes the former approach, while the UK takes the latter, even though during the referendum campaign the Leave side promised acquired rights to both EU citizens in the UK (‘no change’, ‘no less favourable’) and UK citizens in the EU.

The EU position

Basically, the EU position follows the ‘acquired rights’ approach, adopting a broad interpretation of that concept to include rights which will vest in future as well as those ‘in the process of being obtained’, specifically permanent residence status which can be obtained under EU free movement law after five years’ continuous legal residence. It explicitly covers both EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU, including those who previously resided on one side or the other. Protection will be based on equal treatment compared to nationals – reflecting the second option for approaching the issue – for the lifetime of each person, via ‘smooth and simple administrative procedures’.

The EU position goes on to define the personal scope of the deal: those covered by the EU citizens’ Directive (workers, self-employed and economically inactive people – implicitly subject to the limits in the Directive for ‘benefit tourists’, as discussed here), also including family members who arrive before or after Brexit Day. It will also repeat the scope of the EU social security Regulation, which addresses social security coordination in cross-border situations as distinct from immigration status, including frontier workers (ie those who work in the UK but live in France, or vice versa). 

The material scope of the deal (ie the rights to be protected) should include residence rights based on the Treaties or the citizens’ Directive, as well as the procedural rules on documenting those rights; the social security coordination rules, including export of benefits and cumulating social security contributions made in different countries; the supplementary rights in the Regulation on free movement of workers, including workers’ children’s access to education; access to self-employment; and recognition of qualifications which were obtained before Brexit Day or which are in the process of being recognised on that date.  

As for enforcement, the EU side wants this issue to be enforced by the ECJ, and the rules in the withdrawal agreement to be enforced in accordance with pre-Brexit case law of the Court. A separate position paper makes clear that this refers to all of the Court’s current jurisdiction, in particular references from national courts to the ECJ and Commission challenges to the UK.

The UK position

Firstly, the UK paper states that it will not alter the Common Travel Area arrangements between the UK and Ireland (and the Crown Dependencies), including ‘the rights of British and Irish citizens in each others’ countries rooted in the Ireland Act 1949’. To that end, ‘Irish citizens residing in the UK will not need to apply for settled status to protect their entitlements’. (It should be noted that some have questioned how much the Ireland Act in fact protects Irish citizens’ immigration status in the UK).

Next, the document suggests its legal form: the government ‘undertakes to treat EU citizens in the UK according to the principles below, in the expectation that the EU will offer reciprocal treatment for UK nationals resident in its member states’. It’s not clear if this is a unilateral offer conditioned on the assumption that the EU side will match it, or whether it is a proposal to be subject to negotiations with the view to being included in the withdrawal treaty. (At some other points, the document refers to ‘negotiations’ and to an ‘international law’, however).

In detail, the UK government states first that it will comply with EU free movement law until Brexit Day. Next, post-Brexit it ‘will create new rights in UK law for qualifying EU citizens resident here before our exit. Those rights will be enforceable in the UK legal system and will provide legal guarantees for these EU citizens’, alongside ‘commitments in the Withdrawal Agreement which will have the status of international law’. The paper rules out ‘jurisdiction in the UK’ for the ECJ. Furthermore, the government paper pledges to treat ‘all EU citizens equally’ compared to each other, although it is not clear how this fits with the special dispensation for Ireland referred to at the outset. 

While ‘qualifying EU citizens will have to apply for their residence status’, the ‘administrative procedures’ to this end ‘will be modernised and kept as smooth and simple as possible’. But this will be a national process: ‘a separate legal scheme, in UK law, rather than the current one for certifying the exercise of rights under EU law’. This means that the UK government ‘will tailor the eligibility criteria so that, for example, we will no longer require evidence that economically inactive EU citizens have previously held “comprehensive sickness insurance” in order to be considered continuously resident’. The words ‘for example’ there suggest that there might be other (unspecified) differences between the criteria for obtaining status in the UK for EU citizens.

As part of the process, ‘all qualifying EU citizens will be given adequate time to apply for their new residence status after’ Brexit. This will take the form of a ‘guarantee that qualifying individuals will be granted “settled status” in UK law (indefinite leave to remain pursuant to the Immigration Act 1971).’ This means ‘they will be free to reside in any capacity and undertake any lawful activity, to access public funds and services and to apply for British citizenship’.

To get this status, ‘the EU citizen must have been resident in the UK before a specified date’, which is yet to be defined; but it will be in between March 29 2017 when the Article 50 letter was sent, and March 29 2019, Brexit Day (the government is expressly intending to negotiate this with the EU). They must also ‘have completed a period of five years’ continuous residence in the UK before they apply for settled status, at which point they must still be resident’. Since the criteria are national, not based on EU law, the calculation of this period might differ. As for ‘those EU citizens who arrived and became resident before the specified date’ but who have not accrued five years’ continuous residence on Brexit Day, they ‘will be able to apply for temporary status in order to remain resident in the UK until they have accumulated five years, after which they will be eligible to apply for settled status’. 

On the other hand, those EU citizens who arrive after the [un]specified date ‘will be allowed to remain in the UK for at least a temporary period and may become eligible to settle permanently, depending on their circumstances – but this group should have no expectation of guaranteed settled status’. This category of people will therefore be treated quite differently than under the EU proposal.
As for family members, any ‘family dependants’ who join a qualifying EU citizen in the UK before Brexit ‘will be able to apply for settled status after five years’ (including where the five years falls after our exit), irrespective of the specified date’. Again, it is unclear what the definition of ‘family members’ will be. However, family members arriving after Brexit will be subject to the same immigration rules as the family of UK citizens, ‘or alternatively to the post-exit immigration arrangements for EU citizens who arrive after the specified date’. This suggests a willingness to negotiate special rules on this issue with the EU.

There will be an exclusion for ‘those who are serious or persistent criminals and those whom we consider a threat to the UK’; this might not match the rules permitting exclusion of criminals and security threats set out in the EU legislation and ECJ case law. As for ‘benefits, pensions, healthcare, economic and other rights, in the expectation that these rights will be reciprocated by EU member states, the Government intends that:’ settled EU citizens ‘will continue to have access to UK benefits on the same basis as a comparable UK national under domestic law’; those EU citizens who arrived before the specified date will ‘continue to be able to access the same benefits that they can access now – (broadly, equal access for workers/the self-employed and limited access for those not working)’, on their route to settled status. If they later get settled status, they will have access to benefits ‘on the same terms as comparable UK residents’. Also, export of benefits to the EU ‘will be protected for those who are exporting such UK benefits on the specified date, including child benefit, subject to on-going entitlement to the benefit’. (Note that the right to export benefits will implicitly not be offered to those who arrive after the specified date).

Furthermore, ‘the UK will continue to export and uprate the UK State Pension within the EU’; this mainly concerns UK citizens retiring abroad, but some EU citizens will have acquired such rights from their UK employment too.  Other forms of social security coordination will continue, including aggregation of national insurance contributions for UK benefits and state pensions, even if granted after Brexit, and healthcare arrangements set out in UK and EU law; in particular, the UK will ‘seek to protect the ability of individuals who are eligible for a UK European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) before the specified date to continue to benefit from free, or reduced cost, needs-arising healthcare while on a temporary stay in the EU’. Negotiations on ‘an ongoing arrangement akin to the EHIC scheme’ are planned, but there is no reference to negotiations on the other social security issues, even though it may prove technically and administratively difficult to aggregate contributions and pay benefits without a formal basis for cooperation. It is not clear if the UK plans to continue applying any of the relevant EU legislation as such; if it does not, negotiations and implementation of the rules will be more complicated.

Next, as regards education, the UK government ‘will ensure qualifying EU citizens who arrived in the UK before the specified date will continue to be eligible for Higher Education (HE) and Further Education (FE) student loans and ‘home fee’ status in line with persons with settled status in the UK’, as well as maintenance support (where it exists) ‘on the same basis they do now’. Equal treatment in tuition fees will still apply to those EU students who are enrolled during the 2017/18 and 2018/19 academic years ‘for the duration of their course’, along with ‘a parallel right to remain in the UK’ for those students ‘to complete their course’. (There’s no reference to a right to stay for other purposes after Brexit). The UK government ‘will seek to ensure that citizens with professional qualifications obtained in the EU27 prior to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will continue to have those qualifications recognised in the UK (and vice versa)’. This matches the EU position, albeit with more equivocal language.

As for documentation, EU citizens will need to obtain evidence of ‘settled status’ eventually, but they do not need to apply now, although an application process will be set up prior to Brexit ‘to enable those who wish to do so to get their new status at their earliest convenience’. Those who have already got documentation of permanent residence will have to apply again, but ‘we will seek to make sure that the application process for settled status is as streamlined as possible’. Fees will be set ‘at a reasonable level’. There will be a grace period of perhaps two years while all EU citizens resident under the old system have an opportunity to transition to the new one. If they fail to apply to be covered by the new system, they lose their permission to stay.

Finally, the UK will ‘discuss similar arrangements with Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland’ which are also subject to free movement rules ‘on a reciprocal basis’.

As for UK citizens in the EU, the government says they ‘must be able to attain a right equivalent to settled status in the country in which they reside’ and ‘continue to access benefits and services across the member states akin to the way in which they do now.’ The UK will also seek to ensure their continued right to establishment and cross-border provision of services within the EU.

Comments

Since the EU position refers to the continuation of existing law, there are few ambiguities in its meaning (besides those inherent in that existing law anyway – for instance, the exact status of same-sex marriages is pending before the ECJ, as discussed here). There are still some vague points, however. Firstly, is the reference to those who have previously resided in the EU or UK meant to be free-standing, or does it simply refer to the more detailed rules set out in the EU legislation referred to? (For instance, a UK pensioner living in Spain might be receiving a UK pension on the basis of contributions made some years ago). 

Secondly, it seems that the reference to rights based on the Treaties covers non-EU parents of UK children in the UK, ie the so-called Ruiz Zambrano cases (see further discussion here). Thirdly, would UK citizens resident in the EU on Brexit Day still retain the right of free movement between Member States – ie would a UK citizen in France on that day retain full free movement rights to move on to Germany in future? Finally, how would each side distinguish between those UK and EU citizens with acquired rights on Brexit Day, and those (principally those who move afterward) who do not have such rights?

In comparison, the UK position is necessarily vaguer, since it does not refer to EU law as such. As noted above, therefore, some of its key features are unclear, notably the definition of the grounds for ‘settled’ status, the scope of persons who might be excluded from that status, and family members. Much of the UK position uses ‘weasel words’ like ‘seek to ensure’ or ‘akin’.

To the extent that its content can be discerned, the UK position is indisputably offering worse terms both for EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU. First of all, the cut-off date in the EU position is Brexit Day, whereas it might be earlier in the UK position. The UK suggests that EU citizens in the UK might not be treated equally even if they have permanent residence status by the cut-off date, since they will have to transfer to settled status; the application process to that end would not be necessary in the EU position. While the UK will exempt people from the requirement to have Comprehensive Sickness Insurance, it has been argued that the current UK law on this point breaches EU law anyway.

For those EU citizens who do not have settled status by the cut-off date, or who arrive after the cut-off date but before Brexit Day, they will be worse off than under the EU proposal, since they will not be covered by EU free movement law as regards the acquisition of EU permanent residence status. All categories of EU citizen will have a diminished right to family reunion after Brexit Day.

For UK citizens in the EU, the UK position that they should get settled status in the relevant EU country would not necessarily ensure a right equivalent to EU free movement law permanent residence status. Moreover, those who have not obtained such status as of Brexit Day will not necessarily be able to obtain it as easily as EU citizens do, since free movement law would no longer apply. The word ‘akin’ as regards equal treatment is also vague. While the UK would aim to keep their right of establishment and freedom to provide services, there is no reference to the broader free movement rights arguably inferred by the EU position.

The two sides obviously also differ on the role of the ECJ: it would keep its full current role under the EU proposal, while lose its jurisdiction in the UK under the UK proposal. The latter would leave it with jurisdiction over UK citizens in the EU, and arguably a possible limited role in dispute settlement. Note that the UK implicitly is willing to consider an alternative method of dispute settlement: this could be a new court, a form or arbitration, or use of the existing EFTA Court, which applies EU internal market and related law in Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, subject to a requirement to apply ECJ case law adopted before the date of the agreement and to take later case law into account. (This latter requirement matches the EU position, and nearly matches the UK plans for the Great Repeal Bill).

Taken as a whole then, the UK position is much vaguer and offers significantly less to both EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU than the EU position does, although the gap is much wider for those who do not yet have EU permanent residence status. There is also an enforcement gap as regards the role of the ECJ, although there are precedents (notably the EFTA Court, agreements with Switzerland and Turkey) for the EU not insisting that its citizens living outside the EU have their rights enforced by the ECJ. Any compromise would most likely be based on: a) the EU side accepting an alternative means of enforcement of rights other than the ECJ; b) a cut off date of Brexit Day; and c) the two sides agreeing to base protection on the acquired rights approach with certain exceptions (family members admitted after Brexit, more stringent rules for those with criminal convictions).

*This blog post was supported by an ESRC Priority Brexit Grant on 'Brexit and UK and EU Immigration Policy'

Barnard & Peers: chapter 27
Photo credit: Business Mirror

Annex

EU negotiation position

20 The Agreement should safeguard the status and rights derived from Union law at the withdrawal date, including those the enjoyment of which will intervene at a later date (e.g. rights related to old age pensions) as well as rights which are in the process of being obtained, including the possibility to acquire them under current conditions after the withdrawal date (e.g. the right of permanent residence after a continuous period of five years of legal residence which started before the withdrawal date). This should cover both EU27 citizens residing (or having resided) and/or working (or having worked) in the United Kingdom and United Kingdom citizens residing (or having resided) and/or working (or having worked) in one of the Member States of the EU27. Guarantees to that effect in the Agreement should be reciprocal and should be based on the principle of equal treatment amongst EU27 citizens and equal treatment of EU27 citizens as compared to United Kingdom citizens, as set out in the relevant Union acquis. Those rights should be protected as directly enforceable vested rights for the life time of those concerned. Citizens should be able to exercise their rights through smooth and simple administrative procedures.

21. The Agreement should cover at least the following elements:
a) Definition of the persons to be covered: the personal scope should be the same as that of Directive 2004/38 (both economically active, i.e. workers and self-employed, as well as students and other economically inactive persons, who have resided in the UK or EU27 before the withdrawal date, and their family members who accompany or join them at any point in time before or after the withdrawal date). In addition, the personal scope should include persons covered by Regulation 883/2004, including frontier workers and family members irrespective of their place of residence.
b) Definition of the rights to be protected: this definition should include at least the following rights:
i) the residence rights and rights of free movement derived from Articles 18, 21, 45 and 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and set out in Directive 2004/38 (covering inter alia the right of permanent residence after a continuous period of five years of legal residence and the right as regards access to health care) and the rules relating to those rights; any document to be issued in relation to the residence rights (for example, registration certificates, residence cards or certifying documents) should have a declaratory nature and be issued under a simple and swift procedure either free of charge or for a charge not exceeding that imposed on nationals for the issuing of similar documents;
ii) the rights and obligations set out in Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems and in Regulation 987/2009 implementing Regulation 883/2004 (including future amendments of both Regulations) covering inter alia, rights to aggregation, export of benefits, and principle of single applicable law for all the matters to which the Regulations apply;
iii) the rights set out in Regulation 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (e.g. access to the labour market, to pursue an activity, social and tax advantages, training, housing, collective rights as well as rights of workers' family members to be admitted to general educational, apprenticeship and vocational training courses under the same conditions as the nationals of the host State);
iv) the right to take up and pursue self-employment derived from Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

22. For reasons of legal certainty, the Agreement should ensure, in the United Kingdom and in the EU27, the protection, in accordance with Union law applicable before the withdrawal date, of recognised professional qualifications (diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualification) obtained in any of the Union Member States before that date. The Agreement should also ensure that professional qualifications (diplomas, certificates or other evidence of formal qualification) obtained in a third country and recognised in any of the Union Member States before the withdrawal date in accordance with Union law rules applicable before that date continue to be recognised also after the withdrawal date. It should also provide for arrangements relating to procedures for recognition which are ongoing on the withdrawal date.

41. The Agreement should include provisions ensuring the settlement of disputes and the enforcement of the Agreement. In particular, these should cover disputes in relation to the following matters:
– continued application of Union law;
– citizens' rights;
– application and interpretation of the other provisions of the Agreement, such as the financial settlement or measures adopted by the institutional structure to deal with unforeseen situations.

42. In these matters, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (and the supervisory role of the Commission) should be maintained. For the application and interpretation of provisions of the Agreement other than those relating to Union law, an alternative dispute settlement should only be envisaged if it offers equivalent guarantees of independence and impartiality to the Court of Justice of the European Union.


43. The Agreement should foresee that any reference to concepts or provisions of Union law made in the Agreement must be understood as including the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreting such concepts or provisions before the withdrawal date. Moreover, to the extent an alternative dispute settlement is established for certain provisions of the Agreement, a provision according to which future case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union intervening after the withdrawal date must be taken into account in interpreting such concepts and provisions should be included.

Sunday, 5 March 2017

Awaiting the ECJ Judgment in Coman: Towards the Cross-Border Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages in the EU?




Dr Alina Tryfonidou, Associate Professor in EU Law, University of Reading


Photo: Mr Adrian Coman (right) with his spouse, Mr Claibourn Robert Hamilton (left)


Introduction

The legal recognition of same-sex relationships has, in the last couple of decades, become one of the most prominent issues discussed in parliaments, in courts, and in the media, around the world, with views on both sides of the debate being overwhelmingly strong. This is a complicated and sensitive matter which touches on issues relating to human rights, religion, morality, and tradition, as well as on constitutional principles such as equality, autonomy, and human dignity. Despite the fact that there has been research which demonstrates the benefits – especially for young LGB persons – of opening marriage to same-sex couples (see, for instance here), most religions and Churches reject this move and are, even, often vehemently opposed to it, considering homosexuality a ‘sin’, this leading, in turn, to negative societal attitudes towards LGB persons, especially in countries that are deeply religious. The decision to extend legal recognition to same-sex relationships – in countries where this has been made – does not signal the end of the debate, but a number of additional questions emerge once this step is taken: what legal status should be given to same-sex couples? Should they be allowed to adopt children as a couple? Should same-sex couples comprised of two men be allowed to have a child through a surrogacy arrangement? Should same-sex couples comprised of two women be allowed to have a child (as a couple) through medically assisted insemination and, if yes, should the State fund this?

Europe has, until recently, boasted as the most progressive continent regarding the legal recognition of same-sex relationships, with Denmark being the first country in the world to introduce same-sex registered partnerships (in 1989) and the Netherlands being the first country to introduce same-sex marriage (in 2001). In fact, all western EU Member States now make provision for legal recognition of same-sex relationships, and in some of them the law treats same-sex couples in exactly the same way as it treats opposite-sex couples. Yet, the majority of the eastern European countries do not offer legal recognition to same-sex relationships and, in fact, a handful of them have – or have recently introduced – a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage (of the EU Member States, these are Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia).

The EU has managed to avoid having to take a clear stance on the issue of the legal recognition of same-sex relationships, considering that this is a matter that falls exclusively within Member State competence. However, what happens when a married couple comprised of persons of the same sex moves between Member States in exercise of EU free movement rights? Must a same-sex marriage entered into in another Member State be recognised by a Member State which does not provide for the legal recognition of same-sex relationships in its territory, when a Union citizen seeks to rely on EU law to claim family reunification rights on his return to that State? The EU judiciary has, now, been called to clarify the EU’s position on this issue in the Coman case (Case C-673/16). The case is pending before the ECJ and the judgment is eagerly awaited by LGBT organisations, lawyers and academics interested in LGBT rights, and married same-sex couples who have, so far, been disappointed by the lack of clarity as regards the protection they enjoy under EU law when exercising their free movement rights.

LGBT Rights in Romania

Romania does not provide any form of legal recognition for same-sex couples and two draft bills on the matter have been recently rejected by the Romanian Parliament with large majorities. In addition, the country’s Civil Code expressly bans same-sex marriages and registered partnerships and prohibits the recognition of same-sex marriages and registered partnerships entered into abroad. Romania is a deeply religious country with the majority of its population being against the legal recognition of same-sex relationships: in 2016, within a period of six months, around 3 million Romanians signed a petition calling for a referendum to change the country’s constitution to define marriage as an institution between a man and a woman, which, if it yields a positive result, will effectively introduce a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage. The petition – which has been strongly backed by the US Evangelical firm Liberty Counsel and the Romanian Orthodox Church – has been organised by the ‘Campaign for Family’ which is a Romanian coalition of religious and conservative NGOs established in 2015, and has been held valid by the Romanian Constitutional Court. At the moment, there is, still, no constitutional ban on same-sex marriage in Romania, as the proposed constitutional amendment can be made only once it is approved in a referendum and by a majority in the Romanian parliament.

Romania has received one of the lowest scores in ILGA Europe’s Rainbow Map (with only 3 other EU Member States – Poland, Lithuania and Latvia – having received a lower score), as the protection it offers to LGBT persons and same-sex couples appears rather rudimentary. This seems to be reflective of the fact that public acceptance of LGBT people and same-sex relationships in this country is lower than the EU average.

The Coman case is the second reference to the ECJ from Romania concerning LGB rights; the first such case was Asociaţia ACCEPT, which involved the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation under Directive 2000/78 (see the comments on that case by Belavusau here).

The Coman Case

Adrian Coman is a Romanian gay rights activist. He married his male partner (Claibourn Robert Hamilton) – a US citizen – in Belgium in 2010 and the couple currently lives in the US. In 2012, Mr Coman asked the Romanian immigration authorities for information on the requirements for obtaining a residence permit for his spouse. He was told that such a permit would be refused on the ground that the couple’s same-sex marriage could not be recognised in Romania as the Romanian Civil Code bans the recognition of same-sex marriages performed abroad; if Mr Coman’s spouse was a woman, the marriage would have been automatically recognised in Romania and Mr Coman’s spouse would have been entitled to a residence permit by virtue of that. As a result of this, the couple brought an action, claiming that the refusal of the residence permit due to the failure of the Romanian authorities to recognise same-sex marriages contracted abroad, amounted to a breach of Mr Coman’s EU free movement rights as well as to discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation, contrary to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR). The first instance court hearing the case referred a question to the Romanian Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Civil Code. The Romanian Constitutional Court, by a majority of seven to two, then, decided to stay the proceedings and to refer a number of questions for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ, which can be summarised as follows:

a) whether the word ‘spouse’ in Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38 includes a same-sex spouse and, if yes, whether the host Member State is required by the Directive to grant the right of residence on its territory for more than three months to the same-sex spouse of a migrant Union citizen
and, in case the previous question is answered in the negative,

b) whether the same-sex spouse of a migrant Union citizen can qualify as ‘any other family member’ under Article 3(2)(a) of the 2004 Directive or as ‘the partner with whom the EU citizen has a stable relationship’ under Article 3(2)(b) of the Directive and, if yes, whether the host Member State is required to facilitate entry and residence on its territory by the same-sex spouse of a migrant Union citizen, even if it does not recognise same-sex marriage and does not provide for an alternative form of legal recognition for same-sex couples.

The hearing for the case has been scheduled for 30 March 2017. 

The case has attracted extensive national and international media coverage and a number of Romanian and non-Romanian NGOs have intervened.

The Issue in a Nutshell

Although the EU Treaties do not make reference to the family reunification rights of Union citizens who exercise their free movement rights, already in the 1960s it was recognised that if Member State nationals were to move between Member States in furtherance of the Community’s objectives, they had to be given the right to be accompanied by their close family members in the Member State to which they moved (see Regulation 1612/68 and Directive 73/148). Accordingly, secondary legislation has always made provision for family reunification rights – these are, currently, provided by Directive 2004/38 – for Union citizens who exercise their right to move and reside freely in the territory of a Member State other than that of their nationality. In addition ‘returnees’ (i.e. Member State nationals who return to their State of nationality after having exercised free movement rights) have been considered, also, to enjoy such rights by virtue of primary EU law and, in particular, by the EU free movement provisions (see the Singh case); however, as made clear in the O & B case (para. 50), the interpretation of the family reunification rights granted by Directive 2004/38 is relevant to them as well, since the family reunification rights laid down in the Directive apply ‘by analogy’ to returnees, this being the reason that the questions referred in Coman (which involved a ‘returnee’) concerned the interpretation of the Directive.

The ‘spouse’ of the migrant Union citizen (now referred to in Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38), has always been considered one of the family members that can rely on EU law in order to require the Member State of destination to accept him or her in its territory. The nationality of the ‘spouse’ and, in particular, whether he is a Union citizen or a third-country national, has never mattered, as the rationale behind granting family reunification rights has, simply, been to encourage the exercise of free movement by the Union citizen and this can be impeded if the spouse – whatever his/her nationality – cannot accompany or join the migrant Union citizen. Practically speaking, family reunification rights have been mainly used by Union citizens who are married to third-country nationals, as the latter do not enjoy an individual right to free movement under EU law.

The important question for our purposes – and the one raised in Coman – is whether the term ‘spouse’ in this context includes the same-sex spouse of the Union citizen who has exercised free movement rights. A quick perusal of Directive 2004/38 demonstrates that the matter is not clear: the gender- and sexual orientation-neutral term ‘spouse’ is used in Article 2(2)(a) of the Directive, when defining one of the categories of family members that enjoy an automatic right to join or accompany the migrant Union citizen in the Member State of destination, without the meaning of this term being further clarified in any other part of the Directive. This is so, despite the fact that when the proposal for the Directive was discussed by the EU legislature, the question of whether the term should be read to include a same-sex spouse had been expressly laid on the table.

Due to the sensitivity of the issue and the divergence of views among the Member States, the EU legislature consciously chose vagueness over clarity, thus making this an issue that would have to be resolved by judicial interpretation. Coman is the first opportunity that has been given to the ECJ for providing an interpretation of the term ‘spouse’ in this context and for clarifying whether this term must be read as including the same-sex spouse of a Union citizen. Three years ago – in the Cocaj case (C-459/14) – the ECJ was asked to clarify the meaning of the term ‘registered partner’ in the same Directive and to specify, in particular, whether it includes same-sex registered partners, but the reference was subsequently withdrawn by the referring court, meaning that that question remains unresolved.

What Must the Court rule?

Two years ago, the issue of the legal recognition of same-sex relationships in the US was resolved once and for all by the US Supreme Court’s judgment in the Obergefell v. Hodges case. The Supreme Court based its decision to require all US states to extend marriage to same-sex couples and to recognise same-sex marriages contracted in another US state, on a dual basis: a) the need to respect the fundamental right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties protected by the US Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, since the freedom to choose who to marry is central to individual dignity and autonomy; and b) the US Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, since the refusal to open marriage to same-sex couples leads to inequality between same-sex and opposite-sex couples: the former are denied benefits and a status afforded to opposite-sex couples and – unlike the latter – are barred from exercising a fundamental right (i.e. the right to marry).

As argued in another post in this blog, Obergefell v. Hodges is the case that put the US ahead of the EU with regards to the issue of the legal recognition of same-sex relationships, and has stripped the latter of its position as a pioneer in the field of LGBT rights protection. However, is Coman now the EU’s opportunity not merely to catch-up with the US but, also, to re-acquire its position as pioneer in the protection of LGB rights, since EU law already provides protection to LGB persons from discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation in the employment field, something which is currently lacking at federal level in the US?

Coman is only about the cross-border legal recognition of same-sex relationships and, in particular, about the cross-border recognition of same-sex marriages. Accordingly, the Court is not asked to rule on whether the EU – as the US – can require Member States to open marriage to same-sex couples in their own territory. After all, it is clear that even if it was asked to rule on this, its hands would be tied since – as it confirmed not long ago in cases involving sexual orientation discrimination (see, for instance, Römer and Hay) – ‘as European Union law stands at present, legislation on the marital status of persons falls within the competence of the Member States’. This means that whether same-sex couples should be allowed to marry in a Member State, is a matter entirely left to be decided by the said Member State. Refusing to allow same-sex couples to marry does, of course, violate a number of human rights, however because the issue of determining the marital status of persons falls within the exclusive competence of the Member States and because the way that each Member State decides to regulate this matter has not – so far – interfered with the exercise of rights stemming from EU law and/or with the execution of any of the EU’s policies, the issue falls outside the remit of the Court.

The question, therefore, is whether the Court in Coman should rule that the term ‘spouse’ in Directive 2004/38 must be read to include the same-sex spouse of a Union citizen and, thus, to effectively require all Member States (even those that have not opened marriage to same-sex couples in their territory) to admit within their territory the same-sex spouse of Union citizens who move between Member States.

In my view the answer to this question is ‘yes’, and this is for the following reasons.
First, if the ECJ rules that the term ‘spouse’ does not include same-sex spouses, this will amount – in effect – to granting a license to the Member States to restrict the free movement rights of LGB Union citizens who are in a same-sex marriage. It is hard to believe that a Union citizen who is happily married in a Member State would willingly move to another Member State where his/her same-sex spouse would not be allowed to accompany or join him/her; or, assuming that the spouse could join him/her in the host State on another basis (i.e. not as his/her spouse), it would be highly unlikely that (s)he would be willing to move to a Member State where the marriage would not be recognised and, thus, where his/her spouse and him/her would not be treated as a couple for the purposes of taxation, social security, property law, inheritance and so on, with the obvious disadvantages that would ensue from this.

In fact, the current lack of clarity that persists with regards to the mutual recognition of same-sex marriages in EU Member States and the consequent inconvenience that emerges as a result of this uncertainty is, in itself, an obstacle to free movement: being unsure as to whether your same-sex spouse may be able to join you in another Member State and/or be considered as your spouse there is highly likely to deter your exercise of free movement. The ECJ cannot interpret a provision of EU law (namely, Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38) in a way which permits Member States to breach other provisions of EU law (namely, the EU free movement provisions). A measure which impedes the exercise of free movement rights cannot be justified if it violates fundamental human rights protected under EU law (see, for instance, Carpenter, para. 40). Hence, a restriction on free movement which emerges as a result of the failure of a Member State to recognise a same-sex marriage, cannot be justified since, as will be seen below, it breaches a number of fundamental human rights protected under EU law.

Second, the ECJ – as one of the EU institutions – is bound by the EUCFR (see Art. 51(1) EUCFR), in interpreting EU law provisions (including Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38) it must ensure that it does not breach the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation, laid down in Article 21 EUCFR. An interpretation of the term ‘spouse’ which excludes from it same-sex spouses is, clearly, directly discriminatory on the ground of sexual orientation and is, thus, contrary to Article 21 of the Charter. Furthermore, the 2004 Directive itself provides in its Recital 31 that in accordance with the prohibition of discrimination contained in the Charter (in Article 21), Member States must implement it without discrimination between its beneficiaries on, inter alia, the ground of sexual orientation. Accordingly, the Directive itself appears to be requiring an interpretation of its provisions – including of the term ‘spouse’ – which does not give rise to discrimination against same-sex couples.

A third and related reason is that following (as required by Article 52(3) EUCFR) the ECtHR’s recent judgment in Pajić v Croatia (see the comments by Hodson here) which was a case about the family reunification rights of an unmarried same-sex couple, the refusal to recognise same-sex marriages validly recognised in another Member State and the consequent refusal to grant family reunification rights to same-sex married couples when they move between Member States – can amount to a breach of Article 7 EUCFR (the right to private and family life) when read together with Article 20 EUCFR which states that ‘Everyone is equal before the law’, given that same-sex married couples are treated differently, under the law, from opposite-sex married couples who, under EU law, enjoy automatic family reunification rights when they move to another Member State. Although – as confirmed in Pajić (para. 80) – the right to family life (as protected under Article 8 ECHR) does not give the right to a family member to enter or to settle in a particular country for family reunification purposes, States must exercise their ‘immigration policies in a manner which is compatible with a foreign national’s human rights, in particular the right to respect for his or her private or family life and the right not to be subject to discrimination’. Hence, although Article 7 EUCFR cannot, if interpreted in the same manner as Article 8 ECHR, be relied on to require a Member State to admit within its territory the (opposite-sex or same-sex) spouse of a Union citizen, when that provision is read together with Article 20 EUCFR, it requires same-sex spouses to be admitted to the territory of the host State under the same conditions that are imposed on opposite-sex spouses (i.e. automatically).

Fourth – and drawing inspiration from the US Supreme Court’s judgment in the Obergefell v. Hodges case – the refusal of the ECJ to consider same-sex marriages as valid marriages for the purposes of Directive 2004/38, is liable to amount to a breach of another human right protected under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, namely, the right to human dignity (Article 1 EUCFR). The argument goes as follows: forming intimate relationships with other individuals, choosing to formalise these relationships and consequently attaching to them a legal status is an exercise of personal autonomy, which is an aspect of the dignity of every human being. All human beings are equal in dignity. By prohibiting discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation, the EU has accepted the equal worth of all individuals irrespective of their sexual orientation, and, with it, the equal moral worth of opposite-sex and same-sex relationships. When the EU institutions and/or the Member States refuse to give effect to the choices of individuals as regards their same-sex relationships and the legal status attached to them, they treat such relationships differently from opposite-sex relationships and they seem to be considering the relationship choices of LGB individuals who are in a same-sex relationship as inferior to opposite-sex relationships and, hence, as not having the same moral worth as the latter. Treating LGB Union citizens as second-class citizens by failing to recognise and respect their choices in forming intimate relationships and formalising them can, therefore, amount to a violation of their right to human dignity.

Finally – following ECtHR case-law (see, for instance, Wagner) – by interpreting Directive 2004/38 in a way which refuses to recognise a family status (i.e. that of a ‘spouse’) the ECJ may be acting in a way which violates the right to family life, as this is protected under Article 7 EUCFR. In addition, by allowing Member States to relegate same-sex spouses to one of the other categories of family members laid down on the list provided in Directive 2004/38 and to strip them of their legal status – as asked in some of the questions referred to the ECJ in Coman – will, also, be contrary to EU law as this will not, only, amount to a breach of Article 7 EUCFR but will, also amount to a breach of the EU free movement provisions, given that migrant Union citizens will lose the automatic right to be accompanied or joined by their spouse in the Member State where they move, with the obvious deterrent effect that this may have.

It is true that as late as 2001, the ECJ attached a heteronormative meaning to the term ‘marriage’ noting, in its judgment in the case D and Sweden v. Council, that it ‘means a union between two persons of the opposite sex’. In subsequent years, however, it was made clear that the EU does recognise same-sex marriages as valid marriages for the purposes of EU law (for instance, when it comes to the application of the EU Staff Regulations – see the W case). Nonetheless, for the reasons stated above, the ECJ should now take the additional step of clearly holding that all Member States (and even those that do not provide legal recognition to same-sex relationships in their territory) must recognise same-sex marriages validly contracted in another Member State in situations that fall within the scope of EU law. A marriage validly contracted in one Member State – whether between two persons of the same- or two persons of the opposite-sex – should be considered a ‘marriage’ in every other Member State and, thus, the parties to a same-sex marriage should, also, be considered ‘spouses’ for the purposes of Directive 2004/38. This will mean that all EU Member States will be required by EU law to recognise same-sex marriages validly entered into in another Member State, and this will be so irrespective of whether they have opened marriage to same-sex couples in their own territory.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 13

Further Reading:
U. Belavusau and D. Kochenov, ‘On the “Entry Options” for the “Right to Love”: Federalizing Legal Opportunities for LGBT Movements in the EU’ EUI Working Paper Law 2016/09 available here
C. Bell and N. B. Selanec, ‘Who is a “spouse” under the Citizens’ Rights Directive? The prospect of mutual recognition of same-sex marriages in the EU’ (2016) 41 European Law Review 655
C. Cojocariu, ‘Same-Sex marriage before the courts and before the people: the story of a tumultuous year for LGBT rights in Romania’, VerfBlog, 25/1/2017
M. Fichera, ‘Same-Sex Marriage and the Role of Transnational Law: Changes in the European Landscape’ (2016) 17 German Law Journal 383 (available here)
N. Markard, ‘Dropping the Other Shoe: Obergefell and the Inevitability of the Constitutional Right to Equal Marriage’ (2016) 17 German Law Journal 509 (for an analysis of Obergefell) (available here)
S. Titshaw, ‘Same-Sex Spouses Last in Translation? How to Interpret “Spouse” in the EU Family Migration Directives’ (2016) 34 Boston University International Law Journal 45 (available here)
A. Tryfonidou, ‘EU Free Movement Law and the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: The Case for Mutual Recognition’ (2015) 21 Columbia Journal of European Law 195


Tuesday, 27 September 2016

CS and Rendón Marín: Union Citizens and their Third-Country National Parents – A Resurgence of the Ruiz Zambrano Ruling?




Maria Haag, PhD Researcher, European University Institute (Florence, Italy) & Michigan Grotius Research Scholar, University of Michigan Law School (Ann Arbor, Michigan)


Background

Five years ago, the CJEU delivered its infamous Grand Chamber decision in C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano. It held that “Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union” (para 42, emphasis added). This 'genuine enjoyment'-protection had two consequences. First, Union citizens could rely on Article 20 TFEU against their Member State of nationality without having previously made use of their rights to free movement and thus bypassing the Court's general lack of jurisdiction in 'purely internal' situations. Secondly, Member States were precluded from denying a right of residence to third-country national ('TCN') parents or caretakers of minor citizens of that Member State, as these children would otherwise be forced to leave the territory of the EU and thus no longer able to make use of the rights granted by Union citizenship.

Shortly after the delivery of this ground-breaking judgment, the Court of Justice proceeded to interpret Ruiz Zambrano very narrowly in a series of cases (C-434/09 McCarthy, C-256/11 Dereci and Others, C-40/11 Iida, C-356&357/11 O. and S., C-87/12 Ymeraga and Others, C‑86/12 Alokpa and Moudoulou and C-115/15 NA) leading many to wonder about the original significance of the Ruiz Zambrano decision. In contrast to Ruiz Zambrano, these subsequent cases mostly concerned the significance of Article 20 TFEU in a host Member State. The Court held that the applicants fell outside the scope of Article 20, even if they had never moved to another Member State, i.e. had been born in a Member State other than their Member State of nationality and had never left. The most recent cases – C-304/14 CS and C-165/14 Rendón Marín – however, Ruiz Zambrano decision, fully address the right under Article 20 TFEU in the home Member State. On the 13th of September 2016, the Grand Chamber delivered these two decisions in which it considered the effect of a criminal record of a TCN parent on his or her derived residence right under Article 20 TFEU and to what extent this right can be derogated on grounds of public policy or public security.

C-304/14 CS: facts and judgment

The case in CS concerned a Moroccan national, who resided in the UK together with her British national son. In 2012, she was convicted of a criminal offence and given a prison sentence of 12 months. Following her conviction, she was notified of her deportation liability. Her subsequent application for asylum was denied. Upon her appeal, the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) found that her deportation would violate her child's rights under Article 20 TFEU. The Home Secretary was granted permission to appeal this decision before the Upper Tribunal, which asked the CJEU, under which circumstances the expulsion of a TCN caretaker of a Union citizen could be permitted under EU law and whether Article 27 and 28 of the Directive 2004/38 (the ‘citizens’ Directive’, which sets out the main rules on EU citizens who move to another Member State) had any effect in this case.

In its two-part decision, the Court firstly answered the question whether a TCN parent of a Union citizen has a derived right of residence in the home Member State under Article 20 TFEU and, secondly, if such a right can be limited on grounds of public policy or public security.

The Court first firmly restated its holding in Ruiz Zambrano. It explained that Article 20 TFEU "precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving Union citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as Union citizens" (para 26; citing Ruiz Zambrano para 42). Furthermore, this means that "a right of residence must … be granted to a third-country national who is a family member of [a minor Union citizen] since the effectiveness of citizenship of the Union would otherwise be undermined, if, as a consequence of refusal of such a right that citizen would be obliged in practice to leave the territory of the European Union as whole" (para 29). CS thus had a derived right of residence under Article 20 TFEU in her son's home Member State.

Secondly, the Court held that, as a general rule, such a derived residence right can be derogated for reasons of public policy or public security: "where the exclusion decision is founded on the existence of a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to the requirements of public policy or of public security … that decision could be consistent with EU law" (para 40, emphasis added). However, a deportation decision cannot be made "automatically on the basis solely of the criminal record of the person concerned" (para 41). Thus the UK legislation at issue, which obliges the Home Secretary to make a deportation order of any non-national who is sentenced to a period of imprisonment of 12 months or more, establishes "a systematic and automatic link between the criminal conviction of a person … and the expulsion measure" (para 44) and therefore violates EU law. Instead, it is for the national courts to weigh up "the personal conduct of the individual concerned, the length and legality of his residence on the territory of the Member State concerned, the nature and gravity of the offence committed, the extent to which the person concerned is currently a danger to society, the age of the child at issue and his state of health, as well as his economic and family situation" (para 42, emphasis added).

Furthermore, derogations for reasons of 'public policy' or 'public security' must be interpreted strictly and decisions are subject to review by the EU institutions (para 37). Lastly, and most notably, the assessment of the individual situation must take account of the principle of proportionality and the rights protected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ('CFREU'), especially Article 7 on the right to respect of private and family life and Article 24(2) on the obligation of consideration of the child's best interests (paras 48 and 49).

C-165/14 Rendón Marín: facts and judgment

The facts in Rendón Marín are very similar to the ones in CS and essentially raise the same question, presumably why the Court decided these cases on the same day and why Advocate General Szpunar did not give separate opinions in these cases, but combined the two. Rendón Marín concerned a Colombian national father, who lived in Spain together with his Spanish national son and his Polish national daughter. His application for a residence permit was rejected due to his criminal record. The crucial difference between the facts of the two cases is that Mr Rendón Marín has a Union citizen daughter who lives in a host Member State and a son who lives in his home Member State. There thus exists a cross-border element in the situation of his daughter, but not in his son's (For further discussion on the cross-border element, see C-200/02 Zhu and Chen, especially para 19.).

The part of the Court's decision concerning the son's circumstances – a Spanish national in Spain – is almost identical to the Court's judgment in CS. In fact, some of the paragraphs can be found in exactly the same wording in both decisions (the two cases also had the same rapporteur, Allan Rosas). Interestingly, the Court in Rendón Marín mentioned the possibility of moving to Poland, as this is the Member State of nationality of Mr Rendón Marín's daughter. Whilst the Court noted the applicant's objection that the family had no ties to Poland, it did not go into this discussion. (See, in contrast, footnote 109 in Advocate General Szpunar's Opinion in CS and Rendón Marín. For more on this, see also Advocate General Wathelet's Opinion in NA, paras 112-117.) Here the Court simply holds that "it is for the referring court to check whether … the parent who is the sole carer of his children, may in fact enjoy the derived right to go with them to Poland and reside with them there" (para 79, citing Alokpa and Moudoulou paras 34-35). The Court therefore did not deny that moving to Poland could be a possible solution in case of the father's deportation from Spain.

As for the legal status of the daughter, the Court held that, as a Polish national and Union citizen, she could rely on Article 21 TFEU and the Directive 2004/38 to grant her a right of residence in Spain (para 44). Furthermore, the Court stated that if the daughter fulfils the conditions laid down under Article 7(1) Directive 2004/38 (i.e. having sufficient resources and comprehensive health insurance) then the derived right of residence of Mr Rendón Marín, her father and sole caretaker, cannot be refused (para 53). Whilst this derived right of residence can be limited for reasons of public policy or public security (para 57), EU law precludes such limitations on "grounds of a general, preventive nature" (para 61). Instead, it is for the national courts to do a similar weighing-up exercise as laid out in CS (see Rendón Marín, paras 59-66). Derogations from derived rights of residence on the basis of Article 20 TFEU and Article 21 TFEU thus presumably have to withstand the same test.

Comment

After a longer period of silence on this issue, the Court in these cases seems at the very least willing to explore the scope of Ruiz Zambrano. (The Court should soon decide another case, Chavez-Vilchez, which raises some further important questions about the scope of that judgment). The two recent judgments, whilst they in some sense appear to diminish the scope of Ruiz Zambrano even further, can also be seen as a restatement of the fundamental significance of the original judgment.

The cases following the Ruiz Zambrano decision made it very clear that protection under Article 20 TFEU is only applicable to a very small number of people in "very specific situations" (Rendón Marín para 74; CS para 29): essentially only to minors who reside with their TCN parents in their home Member State. CS and Rendón Marín both confirm this, but also clarify that a very high level of protection is granted to those Union citizens who fall within the scope of the 'Ruiz Zambrano-protection'. In fact, the substantive protection against expulsion is equivalent to that of EU citizens (and their family members) who move to another Member State (the Court refers to concepts found in the EU citizens’ Directive and its predecessors, as well as relevant case law), although it is not clear if the same procedural protection applies. 

The Court certainly does not exclude the possibility that "in exceptional circumstances" (CS para 50) a criminal and dangerous parent who poses a threat to a Member State's public policy or public security could be deported. Even if this means that his or her Union citizen children are forced to leave EU territory and thus deprived of the genuine enjoyment of their EU citizenship rights. Nevertheless, the Court insists on a very stringent test before such a decision can be taken.

Most notably, the Court refers to the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights and stresses the fact that a deportation decision needs to take account of Article 7 and Article 24(2) of the Charter (see CS paras 36 and 48; Rendón Marín paras 66 and 85). In Dereci, the Court had previously held that "if the referring court considers … that the situation of the applicants in the main proceedings is covered by European Union law, it must examine whether the refusal of their right of residence undermines the right to respect for private and family life provided for in Article 7 of the Charter" (Dereci, para 72). In that case the Court had decided that the circumstances fell outside the scope of EU law, and that it was therefore beyond its jurisdiction to consider a violation of the Charter. In both CS and Rendón Marín, the Court found that the applicants' circumstances fell within the scope of EU law and thus that the Charter applied.

It is also interesting to compare the protection granted in C-135/08 Rottmann against the deprivation of the legal status of Union citizenship altogether and the protection granted in CS and Rendón Marín against being deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the Union citizenship rights by means of a parent’s expulsion to a non-EU state. Whereas in Rottmann, the Court held that a decision to withdraw someone's nationality needs to respect the principle of proportionality (Rottmann, para 59), in CS and Rendón Marín it established a list of criteria that need to be observed. Curiously, the Rottmann-test therefore appears to be narrower than the one established in CS and Rendon Marin, even if the potential outcome in circumstances like Rottmann, i.e. statelessness, might be much more serious for the individual concerned.

In its decision in CS, the Court cites the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgment in Jeunesse v the Netherlands. The EU Court states in paragraph 49:

"[A]ccount is to be taken of the child's best interests when weighing up the interests involved. Particular attention must be paid to his age, his situation in the Member State concerned and the extent to which he is dependent on the parent (see, to this effect, ECtHR, 3 October 2014, Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, CE:ECHR:2014:1003JUD001273819, §118)."

Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, which was decided by the Strasbourg court in 2014, concerned a Surinamese national, who lived with her Dutch national husband and children in the Netherlands without a valid residence permit. The applicant argued that the refusal to allow her to reside in the Netherlands infringed her right to respect of her family life under Article 8 ECHR. The facts of this case are very similar to the ones in Dereci, in which the Court of Justice held that such a denial of residence right did not conflict with EU law. The ECtHR, however, came to the conclusion that the Dutch authorities had failed "to secure the applicant's right to respect for her family life as projected by Article 8 of the Convention" (Jeunesse v the Netherlands, §122).

So what does the reference to this judgment mean? First and foremost, the CJEU clarifies and stresses the utmost importance of taking account of the children's best interests in these deportation decisions. Secondly, it signals the Court's commitment to taking the fundamental rights of those who fall within the Ruiz Zambrano-protection very seriously.

Finally, the fact that the Court treats the situation of the daughter and the son separately in Rendón Marín reaffirms the Court's findings in previous cases that a Union citizen in a host Member State first has to rely on Article 21 TFEU before Article 20 can be applied. In the NA judgment, which the Court delivered at the end of June 2016, it held that one first has to examine whether the citizen and their TCN caretaker have a right of residence under secondary EU law. Only if there is no such right, can Article 20 TFEU apply.

The NA case concerned a Pakistani national mother who lived in the UK with her German national children where she was refused a right of residence. The Court decided that because it had already held that both the children and their TCN mother had a right of residence in the host Member State under Article 12 of Regulation No. 1612/68 (paras 52-68), which guarantees children of current and former workers the right to access to education in the host Member State, with corollary residence rights for those children and their parents (for more, see CJEU decisions in C-480/08 Teixeira and C-310/08 Ibrahim). Article 20 TFEU did not confer a right of residence in the host Member State. It is clear that the protection under Article 20 TFEU is one of last resort. Whilst the Court in NA and Rendón Marín does not directly rule out the possibility that the Ruiz Zambrano-protection might apply in a host Member State, it now almost seems impossible. It appears that that protection can only be granted by the home Member State.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 13
JHA4: chapter I:6